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Introduction
In the last four decades, since the introduction of
the concept of ‘social persona’ into archaeology, the
debate on the relationship between individuals and
the societies of which they form part was a feature
of both processual and post-processual archaeology
in English-speaking countries and Scandinavia. This
debate has had huge implications for the study of
identities and individuals in prehistory. It is worth
remembering that in processual perception, the indi-
vidual is recognised as part of a group’s passage
through a sequence of egalitarian, ranked and stra-
tified societies on the one hand, and passivity and
submission to their respective social norms and pres-
sures on the other. In the post-processual model, the
focus shifts to agency and the role of social action.
Parallel to the Giddens’ concepts of ‘knowledgeable
social actor’, Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ was in-
troduced into archaeology. The first of these postu-
lates an explicit understanding of the agency of an
individual social actor capable of manipulating or
transforming the rules which govern their behaviour.
The latter relates to people’s understanding of the
world; an understanding that was not based on ex-
plicit rules, but on the principles that governed prac-
tice. The focus has recently shifted from the notion
of the ‘bounded individual’1 to the ‘dividual’ and
‘partible’ person as the main paradigm for person-
hood and agency, not in order to discuss the posi-
tion of the person in the social system (agency)
only, but the position of the person within the cos-
ABSTRACT – This paper discuses the conceptualisation of ‘partible’ and ‘permeable’ dividual person-
hood in archaeology. It focuses on flows of substances as media which produce relations with oth-
ers and are used in altering the composition of the person according to specific doctrines of prac-
tice. It presents the manipulation of the dead in funerary and other mortuary practices that may
have been correlative with interpretations of identity in the past.
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1 Descartes’ view of ‘person’ was discussed by Marcel Mauss ([1938] 1985.20–21). The classic Cartesian conceptions of the person
as a ‘well-defined, stable entity with impermeable boundaries, and a unified and essential core’ were regarded as being unique to
Western thought. In his classical essay on the notion of person, Mauss considered this as a category of the human mind. The essay
reviews various forms of person-related beliefs across societies and through time. The analysis is framed in cultural evolutionary
perspective, which describes a progressive transformation from a person’s character (personnage) being organized around ascribed
roles into that of a person-subject of rights and duties, and into an autonomous self-centered individual. In the Maussian perspec-
tive, ‘modern’ and ‘western’ societies are considered paradigmatic of egocentric societies, while African and Asian societies are pre-
sented as typical examples of sociocentric societies.
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mological universe (personhood) (e.g., Barrett 2000;
Brück 2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 2009;
Chapman 2000a; 2000b; Chapman and Gaydarska
2007; Fahlander 2008; Fahlander and Oestigaard
2008; Fowler 2004; 2010; Gillespie 2001; Graham
2009; Guerrero et al. 2009; Jones 2005; Morris
2000; Meskell and Joyce 2003; Nilsson Stutz 2003;
Thomas 1996; 2002). However, we must be aware
of how perceptions of the individual (autonomous)
and dividual (social and cosmological relational)
aspects of personhood vary across different cultures
and in different contexts within the same culture
(e.g., the Euro-American capitalist notion of a person
as wholly individual, autonomous, self-contained,
and self-moving agent versus the complex negotia-
tion of contextual and interpersonal constructions of
the self in India’s caste system) (LiPuma 1998; Chau-
dary 2008).
Personhood
In its broadest definition, personhood refers to ...the
condition or state of being a person, as it is under-
stood in any specific context. Persons are consti-
tuted, de-constituted, maintained and altered in
social practices through life and after death. This
process can be described as the ongoing attain-
ment of personhood. Personhood is frequently
understood as a condition that involves constant
change, and key transformations to the person oc-
cur throughout life and death. People may pass
from one state or stage of personhood to another.
Personhood is attained and maintained through
relationships not only with other human beings
but with things, places, animals and the spiritual
features of the cosmos. Some of these may also
emerge as persons through this engagement. Peo-
ple’s own social interpretations of personhood and
of the social practices through which personhood
is realized shape their interactions in a reflexive
way, but personhood remains a mutually constitu-
ted condition. (Fowler 2004.4). 
The dividual perception of the person stresses that
each person is a composite of the substances and
actions of others; each person encompasses multi-
ple constituent things and relations received from
other people. Not only substances, but also objects,
or even animals are incorporated into the person by
the agency of ceremonial gift exchange. In a fune-
rary rite, all of these different elements of the per-
son are brought together around the deceased. The
rite thus brings the person together. The implication
is that, while alive, the person is distributed through-
out the social and material world, and only becomes
a whole person temporarily during this mortuary
rite. All the things that the person embodies are
brought together and made explicit for everyone to
see. They are then divided again, and these parts
are redistributed through mortuary exchanges. Thus
personhood is neither fixed nor stable; it is a compo-
site and partible ‘artefact’ that marks the handling of
relationships through the possession and manipu-
lation of things, especially those that conceptualise
wealth and exchange.
Using ethnographic data, Chris Fowler identified se-
veral ‘modes of personhood’ that provide the forms
that relationships are supposed to take. Contempo-
rary modes of personhood are as follows: (i) indivi-
duality and indivisibility, (ii) individuals and, (iii)
dividuals and dividuality. The first two refer to the
perception of the ‘western individual’ and to the
‘state of being a unitary’ in which a constant indivi-
duality and a persistent personal identity are stres-
sed over relational identities. The latter is grounded
on ethnographic data and relates to perceptions in
which ‘the person is recognized as composite and
multiply-authored’. The dividual person is a compo-
site of the substances and actions of others, which
means that each person encompasses multiple con-
stituent things and relations received from other
human beings, animals, material objects on the one
hand, and ancestors and spirits on the other. In this
context, persons are believed to be ‘partible’ and
‘permeable’. The component parts of the ‘partible’
person are identifiable as objects and can be extrac-
ted. The partible perception of a person is recogni-
sable through mortuary and marriage rites and in
ceremonial exchanges in many Melanesian contexts.
The permeability and permeable person are not, how-
ever, identifiable as objects, but as flows of substan-
ces. The permeable person is thus constituted in the
flow of substances (blood, semen, etc.) between
members of the group through exchanges, marriage
and feasts. The notion is based on Busby’s (1997)
and Marriott’s (1976) cross-cultural ethnographic stu-
dies of permeability in South India and on Strathern’s
(1988) studies of partibility in Melanesia (Fig. 1).
Persons are thus composed of social relations with
other human beings, or with others who are objecti-
fied as ancestors, animals, objects etc., and therefore
owe parts of themselves to others, as revealed in
mortuary and marriage rites. Alternatively, persons
are constituted in the flow of substances ratified by
exchanges, marriage, feasts and so on between mem-
bers of the group.
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It is not that obvious, as it has been widely sugge-
sted, that the Asiatic dividual, ‘partible’ and ‘perme-
able’ notions of personhood are very different from
Western (e.g., capitalistic) perceptions of the person
as a wholly individual, autonomous, self-contained
agent. Exploring the conceptual and historical rela-
tionship between Western and Melanesian persons,
LiPuma (1998.59–60) argues that, in the West, both
individual and dividual modes of personhood exist:
“For the West the notion of person as wholly indi-
vidual, as an autonomous, self-contained, self-mo-
ving agent is characteristic primarily of capitalism
(Bourdieu 1984; Postone 1993). The person in ca-
pitalist society has two defining features. (1) the
person is composed, historically and culturally, of
dividual and individual aspects; and (2) paradoxi-
cally, the person appears as the natural and tran-
shistorical individual. The double character of the
person is intrinsically bound to, and homologous
with, the character of commodity-determined la-
bor. Unlike Melanesia where products are distribu-
ted by ties of kinship and community, and over re-
lations of power and domination, in capitalist so-
cieties “labor itself replaces these relations by ser-
ving as a kind of objective means by which the
products of other are acquired [such that] a new
form of interdependence comes into being where ...
one’s own labor or labor products function as the
necessary means of obtaining the products of oth-
ers. In serving as such a mean, labor and its pro-
duct preempt that function on the part of mani-
fest social relations” (Postone 1993.6–7). So it is
that commodity-determined labor is mediated by
structures such as that of personhood (and also
class) that it itself constitutes. The social relations
of capitalism are thus based on a quasi-indepen-
dent structure that stands apart from, and opposed
to, persons understood as individuals. Labor, here,
as socially mediating activity creates relations
among persons which, though social and contai-
ning dividual elements, assume a quasi-objective
and individualist character.”
In capitalist society, labour thus replaces the rites,
ceremonial exchange and feasts which structure kin-
ship and community by serving as a kind of objec-
tive means by which the products of others are ac-
quired. A new form of interdependence comes into
being, where one’s own labour functions as a neces-
sary means of obtaining the products of others, the-
reby liberating one from dependence on lineage ties.
The person becomes, at least in ideology, materiali-
sed as a self-contained and self-shaping independent
agent. 
Almudena Hernando (2010) agrees that individuality
is a form of personal identity ‘resulting from the gra-
dual historical development of socio-economic con-
ditions of functional division and work specializa-
tion’. Thus it is suggested that a subject’s attachment
to the surrounding world is central in their percep-
tion of themselves in egalitarian societies. This per-
ception is embedded in a complex network of rela-
tionships comprising humans, animals, plants, and
any other significant objects of reality (i.e. nature).
On the other hand, a subject’s detachment from the
surrounding world is associated with ‘increasing
technological mastery over nature’ and, the process
of ‘individualization’. Increasing power over nature
leads to a perception of nature as no longer human-
like, and therefore, personal relations with it are lost.
Norbert Elias (1991.140) in his chapter on ‘Prob-
Dividual and partible (Melanesia)
A person is a collection of relations, any of which may be
temporarily brought to the fore.  Qualities  can  be added
and extracted.
Persons  identify  relations which  are  objectified< as ani-
mals,  objects, body  parts, substances, etc.  These can be
externalised through separation or incorporated through
encompassment. As well as being objectified they may be
personified.
Things fluctuate between being male and female, and
singly and multiply gendered, depending on the context
of their use.
Personhood  is  highly  relational, and  identities  are per-
formed or presented.
Dividual and permeable (southern India)
A  person  is fundamentally  a  collection of relations, and
is a bounded being from whom qualities cannot be fully
extracted though ratios may change.
Substance-codes can permeate the ‘fluid boundaries’ of
the  person.  Flows  of  substance  extend  from persons,
they are not objectified as a specific part of the person.
Substance-codes have fixed properties (e.g. hot or cold).
Personhood  is  relational, but  is  also  strongly sub-
stantial.
Fig. 1. Differences between ‘partible’ and ‘permeable’ dividual personhood based on Busby’s (1997)
ethnographic studies. The flows of substances are media which produce relations with others and are
used in altering the composition of the person according to specific doctrines of practice (from Fowler
2004.Tab. 2.1).
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lems of Self-consciousness and the Image of Man’,
states that “It is probably unusually difficult to rea-
lize today that qualities of human beings related
to by terms such as “individuality” are not simply
given by nature, but are something that has deve-
loped from biological raw material in the course
of a social process. This is a process of “individua-
lization”, which in the great flow of human deve-
lopment is inseparable from other process such as
the increasing differentiation of social functions
and the growing control of non-human natural
forces.”
With the growing specialisation of societies, social
positions became increasingly differentiated, and
within such a network of separate functions ‘more
and more people came to live in increasing depen-
dence on each other, while each individual was at
the same time growing more different from the oth-
ers’. Parallel to this, the demand of ‘social control’
(i.e. commands and prohibitions) that a person ‘in-
ternalizes as his or her conscious and unconscious
self-control’ increase. Elias (1991.13) thus postulated
that control of nature, social control, and self-control
form a “kind of ‘chain ring’; they form a triangle
of interconnected functions which can serve as a
basic pattern for the observation of human affairs.
One side cannot develop without others; and if one
of them collapses, sooner or later the others follow”. 
The concept of the individualisation of the self as
the cognitive counterpart of a process of increasing
technological domination over nature is applied in
the studies of indigenous groups in the South Ame-
rican Lowlands (Hernando 2008; 2010; Hernando
et al. 2011). The Awá-Guajá, a small indigenous group
of around 300 individuals living in a seasonally dry
tropical forest area of the state of Maranhão (Brazil)
on the eastern flanks of the Brazilian Amazon re-
gion, was systematically studied in recent years.
They are hunter-gatherers in transition to agricul-
ture. Since the early 1970s, after their first contact
with Brazilian society and the deforestation of the
forest, when they were removed from their traditio-
nal lands and relocated to demarcated reservations,
their way of life has changed. Their mobility has
been reduced and they have been forced to take up
cultivation.
Hernando (2010.295) suggests that in this and any
other egalitarian group without a division of tasks
or specialisation, individualisation does not define
the personal identity of anyone, since all (men and
women) need to feel bonded to the group to feel
safe enough in the middle of a universe which they
do not dominate. On the other hand, she hypothesi-
ses that gender differences “may be universal in
‘egalitarian’ societies at the symbolic level because
they result from the social construction of male
and female personhood, which in turn is partly de-
termined by the different degrees of mobility invol-
ved in male and female tasks” (Hernando 2011.
191). She suggests that the ‘slightly higher individua-
listic component of male personhood’ is connected
with the greater degree of mobility inherent in men’s
tasks within the gendered distribution of productive
activities, which is in turn mainly aimed at protec-
ting fragile and vulnerable human offspring. Male
and female activities in egalitarian societies are com-
plementary; the difference is determined by the need
to avoid exposing women to dangerous tasks that
might harm their infant children, who are extreme-
ly vulnerable and completely dependent on mater-
nal care. Women can work as hard as men, but they
take fewer risks, and that small disparity has a huge
impact in the construction of personhood, because
greater risk and higher mobility stimulate a person’s
perception of individuality, autonomy, and indepen-
dence from the social group to which they belong.
Male specialisation in affinal relationships2 could
grant men a kind of autonomy related to the power
they may exercise, which is not yet material nor eco-
nomic, but only symbolic. This specialisation is not
yet patriarchal, since it does not involve power rela-
tions between the sexes, although it creates condi-
tions for the development of male dominance when
functional divisions increase within the group.
Hernando’s deduction that men’s greater mobility
results in increasing power, which leads to increas-
ing emotional isolation, which contributes to indivi-
dualisation, is reminiscent of Elias’ conception of the
‘subject’s detachment from the surrounding world’
as a cognitive prerequisite for individuality and the
exercise of power and a ‘a triangle of interconnected
functions’ that link the control of nature, social con-
trol, and self-control, as we mentioned above. How-
2 Relationships established by women tend to be consanguineal, and those established by males affinal. The consanguine and af-
fine gendering relationships were initially hypothesised for hunter-gatherer societies. Men in these groups seem much more incli-
ned to interact with the ‘others’, the different, the alien, while women tend stick to well-known things and people. According to
Viveiros De Castro (cf. Hernando 2010.292), all dealings with the ‘outside world’, where ‘potential affines’ dwell, belong to the
men’s sphere, while the women’s domain encompasses the ‘inside world’ of supporting bonds and familiar, domestic, unremarka-
ble, well-known beings and things.
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ever, Hernando et al. (2011.192) thus agrees “...with
Conklin and Morgan (1996: 659) that personhood
cannot be reduced to essentialist categories or re-
ductionist dichotomies such as Western “individ-
ualism” versus non-Western “sociocentrism” (or
“relationality”) (see also Spiro 1993). Personhood
is “more an interactive process than a fixed loca-
tion on a social grid” (Conklin and Morgan 1996:
667). Personhood is as much shaped by social
practices as it is expressed in those practices them-
selves. We believe the key to understanding gender
differences along the course of history lies preci-
sely in the fluid interplay between personhood and
social practices. In between a “relational” and an
“individualistic” sense of personhood lies a whole
range of possible combinations – which we believe
are not socially constructed in the same way for
men and women within the same social group.”
It is worth remembering that when discussing per-
sonhood “there is no question that relationships
among self/person, body, mind, and sociality are
universal cultural preoccupations”, but its percep-
tion “should emerge, not from our own Euroameri-
can philosophical or social science a priori catego-
ries, but rather need to be approached as they are
in their own right”, and personhood may include
“beliefs and practices concerning some, or all of
the following: a soul or spirit; body; mind; emo-
tions, agency; gender or sex; race, ethnicity, caste;
relationships with other people, places, or things;
relationship with divinity; illness and well-being;
power; karma or fate, as ingrained in or written on
body or soul in some way” (Rassmusen 2008.38). 
The search for past forms of personhood
In the search for past forms of personhood, Chap-
man and Gaydarska (2007; 2011) focused on ‘divi-
duals’ as the embodiment of identities based on re-
lations with places, things and other persons, and
on individualised persons’ as the grounding of indi-
vidual identities in linguistic, social, creative and
task-based skills and capacities. They go beyond Li-
Puma’s (1998) approach in identifying the kinds of
embodied skills and associated social roles that crea-
ted Mesolithic and Neolithic personhoods. They sug-
gest a number of skills and social roles for the crea-
tion of types of Mesolithic (14) and Neolithic (25)
personhood in the Balkans (Chapman and Gaydar-
ska 2011). The types of personhood range from
‘hunting’ and ‘plant-gathering’ to ‘farming’ and ‘her-
ding’ skills; from ‘stone tool-making’ to ‘ploughing’
and ‘dairy producing’ skills; from ‘basket-making and
string-bag-making’ to ‘house-painting’ skills, etc. The
interpretative legitimacy of Chapman’s and Gaydar-
ska’s approach is based on the concept of ‘dynamic
nominalism’, which holds that “numerous kinds of
human beings and human acts come into being
hand in hand with our invention of the ways to
name them” (Hacking 2002.113). 
According to Ian Hacking, human types have their
genesis in the continuous interrelations between so-
cial labels and classes. A classificatory label is impo-
sed on a group or class of people, who then begin
to act intentionally under the label. The label is
used to describe and denote a certain mode of be-
haviour, and then the label, and its associated ap-
propriate actions, become normative for the mem-
bers of the group. The forces that objectify the exis-
tence of human types are ‘vectors from above and
below’, the social forces “from above, from a com-
munity of experts who create a “reality” that some
people make their own. Different from this is the
vector of the autonomous behavior of the person
so labelled, which presses from below, creating a
reality every expert must face” (Hacking 1986.234).
While the vector from above is the act of labelling
by authority, the vector from below is the intentio-
nal actions of individuals. Both vectors combine to
create normative forces that constrain people de-
scribed by different labels to act and behave in the
appropriate manner. These vectors are to be under-
stood as social forces that have the power across so-
cial times and places to bring some social worlds to
an end and to create new ones. In the intersection
of these social forces lies a virtual infinity of new
‘kinds of people’ and associated, new intentional ac-
tions and behaviours. In Chapman’s and Gaydar-
ska’s approach, these vectors are interpreted as a
generative power that combines agency, structure
and things ‘in the formation of identities’ and ‘the
creation of personhood’ (Chapman 2000a.34–37;
2000b; Chapman and Gaydarska 2007.16, 55). In
other words, the acquisition and development of
embodied skills and their combinations and com-
petences are key facets of a person's individualisa-
tion and participation in social life. The shift from
dividual to individualising personhood is associated
with settlement nucleation, which leads to a wider
diversity of persons with different skills and a grea-
ter likelihood of new skills combinations leading to
more individualised identities. The increase in the
number of skills in the process of the transition to
farming, Chapman and Gaydarska suggest, allow us
to categorise persons in terms of their skills through
their linkages to material culture, and to recognise
Mihael Budja
50
the rise in the diversity of personal identities in the
Neolithic.
A different approach to the notion of agency and
personhood takes agency as a moral category. So-
fia Voutsaki (2010.71) suggests different modes by
means of which people define themselves and their
positions in a social system and cosmological uni-
verse. Thus “every action bears, expresses and re-
flects upon moral beliefs, because people act in
pursuit of certain goods that define the purpose
and meaning of their life”. She introduces MacIn-
tyre’s concept of moral agent by saying that we “al-
ways act, whether consciously or unconsciously,
with a certain purpose in mind, a set of goals de-
fined within a moral code, a cultural tradition and
a set of historical conditions”.
Alasdair MacIntyre, a moral and political philoso-
pher, through his use of the concept of a practice
(e.g., maintaining a household and a family in the
pre-modern world), postulates that in heroic society,
morality and social structure are conflated. When
individuals in heroic society – as described by Ho-
mer in the Iliad and Odyssey – first engage in a prac-
tice, they have no choice but to agree to accept ex-
ternal standards for the evaluation of their acts and
to agree to follow the rules set out for the practice.
Practices are important, because it is only within the
context of a practice that human beings can practice
the virtues.
“A virtue is an acquired human quality the posses-
sion and the exercise of which tends to enable us
to achieve those goods which are internal to prac-
tices and the lack of which effectively prevents us
from achieving any such goods … we have to ac-
cept as necessary components of any practice with
internal goods and standards of excellence the vir-
tues of justice, courage, and honesty ... Now the
virtues are those goods by reference to which, whe-
ther we like it or not, we define our relationships
to those other people with whom we share the kind
of purposes and standards which inform prac-
tices.” (MacIntyre 2007.191). Practices involve mo-
ral standards of ‘excellence and obedience to rules
as well as the achievement of goods’. MacIntyre
makes a distinction between external and internal
goods. Wealth, fame and power are external goods
because they can be achieved by a variety of prac-
tices and are typically objects of competition. Inter-
nal goods can only be attained by adopting the stan-
dards of excellence and obedience definitive of a
specific practice, and can only be achieved by those
who possess virtues, i.e. a disposition to act in the
correct manner. In contrast to external goods, those
internal to a practice enhance the position of the en-
tire group who participate in the practice. 
The main purpose of human agency in heroic socie-
ties, where the warrior is the paradigm of human ex-
cellence, is to realise the goods internal to practices
such as fighting, hunting or feasting. The entire
group thus ‘celebrates a victorious battle’, ‘benefits
from a successful hunting expedition’ or ‘enjoys a
generous feast’ to increase the glory of the kin and
social group, and to ensure fidelity and reliability
among fighting companions and allies. A moral
agent is of necessity a social agent in so far as his
perception must match that of the group. Moral stan-
dards are always bound up with society as a whole
and differ between societies according to each soci-
ety’s respective structure. Each individual has a fixed
role resulting from their position in the social net-
work, primarily through their particular ties to kin,
and each individual has the specific obligations and
privileges attached to that position. “The self beco-
mes what it is in heroic societies only through its
role; it is a social creation, not an individual one”
(MacIntyre 2007.129). Each individual in such a so-
ciety “... has a given role and status within a well-
defined and highly determinate system of roles
and statuses… In such a society a man [sic] knows
who he is by knowing his role in these structures;
and in knowing this he knows also what he owes
and what is owed to him by the occupant of every
other role and status” (MacIntyre 2007.122). Thus,
people do not attempt to determine morality in
terms of abstract objective rules which apply equally
to all; to place oneself outside of society is to cease to
exist, because each person’s identity makes sense
only in the context of that society. In any particular
situation, an individual is able to understand what
she or he should do: whatever is appropriate for a
person in their position to do which shows the pro-
per regard for someone, meets the particular obliga-
tions they have, and accords with what duty requires
of them, etc. It is also clear what and how actions
must be performed in order to accomplish these
things. “If someone kills you, my friend or brother,
I owe you their death and when I have paid my debt
to you their friend or brother owes them my death.
The more extended my system of kinsmen and
friends, the more liabilities I shall incur of a kind
that may end in my death.” (MacIntyre 2007.124). 
The genuine moral codex of rules and standards
that developed in the past and is binding in present-
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day societies leads Voutsaki to conclude that in he-
roic societies the self was not detachable from the
social structure, or from history and tradition. A mo-
ral code, a cultural tradition and a set of historical
conditions became central in interpreting past per-
sonhood and agency. Personhood, she suggests, is to
be understood “as fluid, but firmly embedded in so-
cial relations, moral traditions and historical con-
ditions”, and to be examined first “by exploring the
interfaces of the person” that correlate to (i) “the
relation between the person and his/her kin, age,
sex group and social community”; (ii) “the rela-
tionship with the ‘Other’, i.e. with neighbouring
or distant ethnic and cultural groups”; (iii) “the re-
lationship between persons and the ‘supernatural’
– gods, spirits, or supernatural beings”; (iv) “the re-
lationship between persons and (animate or in-
animate) objects”; and (v) “the relationship be-
tween persons and the natural world, specifically
humans and animals” (Voutsaki 2010.74). 
The perception of the dead in the Homeric world,
she suggests, was as a ‘relational, embedded, perme-
able and partible dividual’. Mortuary practice was a
deeply moral issue that conveyed proper respect for
the dead or piety towards ancestral spirits. Following
the classic studies by Hertz and Van Gennep, she
suggests that the tripartite structure of the mortuary
ritual – in particular the disarticulation of skeletons
and partial destruction of offerings during secon-
dary treatment – indicate a belief in the gradual tran-
sformation of the dead into a ghost or spirit and an-
cestor. In this transformation, humans seem to re-
cognise certain animals as equals, possibly as per-
sons in their own right. The relationship between
people and objects is deeply permeable. Objects be-
come bound up with human projects/agency, and
conversely, people absorb things into their own per-
sonal identities. The fusion between subject and
object, e.g., the use of valuables in bodily practices,
takes place just as persons begin to dissolve into an-
cestors. The deposition of wealth in graves not only
establishes communication across different planes of
existence between mourners and ancestors, but it
seems that it masks the disintegration of personal
identities, as it displays the personal achievement
and excellence of the deceased. Mortuary rituals the-
refore reassemble and manipulate personal identi-
ties on one hand, whilst also restricting the mourn-
ers by the agency of social obligations and relations,
and by moral commitments, cultural traditions, and
religious obligations summarised in the notion of
proper respect for the dead. 
The palimpsest: mortuary practices and the
transformation of the person
The evidence for the manipulation of the dead in fu-
nerary and other mortuary practices has long been
correlative with interpretations of identity in the
past. They were central in interpretative trajectories
from ‘social persona’ to ‘relational personhood’ (see
Budja 2010). Treatment of the dead has been shown
to be important for the realignment of personhood
after death. It is believed that the manipulation of
corpses was associated with ancestral rites and mo-
numents on the one hand, and was used to reinforce
the existing social order through the construction of
collective memory on the other. It has recently been
demonstrated how human and animal body parts or
bones and objects acted as metaphors for the divi-
dual nature of the person, and how they were cen-
tral to the affirmation of identities and the power of
the living (Berggren and Nilsson Stutz 2010; Brück
2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2006a; 2006b; Chapman
2000b; Fowler 2001; 2004; 2010; Fahlander 2008;
Fahlander and Oestigaard 2008; Graham 2009;
Guerrero et al. 2009; Kuijt 2008; Morris 2000; Nils-
son Stutz 2003; 2010; Thomas 2000; Williams
2003). 
Thus Howard Williams (2003) suggests that combs,
deliberately broken and placed in the cinerary, ac-
ted as an extension of the body and were used as
a metaphor for the transformation of the deceased
‘into a new ancestral material form’, the realignment
of the personhood of both the living and the dead.
Combs and toilet sets were selected, together with
burnt human and animal bones, artefacts, and the
ceramic urn used to enclose them, and placed with
the dead to articulate the building of a new ‘body’
for the dead. Following ethnographic and historical
evidence, Williams (2003.127) postulates that as
symbols of vitality or regeneration, combs served
“to incorporate the dead into a new state in the
post-cremation rites. Their efficacy built on their
role as mnemonic devices connecting the living
with the deceased and orchestrating the remem-
bering and forgetting of the social person. Bones
and material culture were retrieved, transported
and buried together to articulate the social, ontolo-
gical and cosmological transitions through which
both the mourners and the dead had passed.”
In a Roman funerary practice known as os resectum,
the metacarpal bone acted as a metaphor for the
dividual body and person of the deceased. Festus re-
marks that, in order to observe the obsequies after
Mihael Budja
52
the cremation, a digit must be cut from the corpse
and set aside; in his discussion of the end of mour-
ning, Cicero comments that the severed bone should
be buried in the earth; meanwhile, Varro states that
‘if a bone of the dead man has been kept out for the
ceremony of purifying the household, the household
remains in mourning’ until it is buried (cf. Graham
2009.55–57). The os resectum was removed from
the corpse prior to cremation, kept during the mour-
ning period – when it acted as a metaphor for the
dividual body and person of the deceased – and then
cleansed alongside the mourners during purification
(suffitio), when they stepped over a fire while being
sprinkled with water, and finally buried. Thus, Em-
ma-Jayne Graham (2009) suggests this ritual may
have acted as been a metaphor for the dissolution
of the social body of the dead and the transforma-
tions that all participants experienced. The os resec-
tum underwent a visible physical transformation
that symbolised the changing status of all the par-
ticipants. The personhood both of the dead and the
living was deconstructed during the nine-day limi-
nal period, when the house was considered impure
(funesta) and the family and corpse were enclosed
in a polluted (and polluting) liminal zone beyond
the norms of society. At the end of this period, the
new social persona of both parties was created anew
and new relationships were created based on mu-
tual dependency. The ancestors would not terrorise
the living if regularly honoured and remembered.
It has recently been demonstrated how body parts
or bones acted as metaphors for the dividual nature
of the person, and how they were central to the af-
firmation of identities in the British Bronze Age. In
the recreation of a new body for the deceased, ob-
jects with metaphorical connections to the mainte-
nance of the person were used. Artefacts and human
and animal bones acted as extensions of the body
and as metaphors for the transformation of the de-
ceased and the realignment of the self of both the
Fig. 2. Bronze Age burial in barrow 40 at Garton
Slack. The mandible of the deceased was removed,
and a miniature vessel inserted into the mouth
(from Brück 2006a.Fig.4).
Fig. 3. Early Neolithic male pit burial at Nea Niko-
medeia. A pebble had been placed in his mouth
(from Perlès 2001.Fig. 13.2). 
Fig. 4. Early Neolithic (Körös culture) anthropo-
morphic vessel in which the fragment of a human
skull was placed (from Kalicz 1980.Tab. 2).
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living and the dead, and the reproduction of soci-
ety through cyclical processes of fragmentation, dis-
persal and reincorporation. Thus skull fragments
are frequently recovered from settlement contexts,
where they were deliberately deposited in pits and
ditches. Some fragments were carefully shaped in
the form of a pierced disc or roundel. In a grave that
contained two inhumations, the mandible of a third
individual was deposited. Several bones from an
adult male were found with the complete inhuma-
tion of an adult female. The inhumation of a juve-
nile was accompanied by a few bones from an adult.
This suggests that “pieces of ancestral bone which
had been retained, circulated, and perhaps passed
down over the generations were on occasion con-
sidered appropriate for inclusion with the burial
of a newly deceased member of the community”
(Brück 2006a.83).
On the other hand, it has been suggested that a crou-
ched inhumation with a deposit of cremated bone
behind its lower back, broken human bones at the
knees of a central inhumation, and a child’s remains
placed at the feet of an inhumation, were placed in
positions where one might expect to find pots. These
placements perhaps served to underline the meta-
phorical link between people
and objects, in this case pots.
Sometimes pots even became
part of the human body. In
the Bronze Age inhumation
burial at Garton Slack in Bri-
tain, the mandible of the crou-
ched inhumation had been re-
moved. It was then placed on
the deceased’s chest and a mi-
niature vessel inserted into
the mouth of the deceased
(Brück 2006a.84) (Fig. 2). 
Similarly, the pebble stuck in-
to the jaws of the tightly flexed
male adult at Early Neolithic
sites at Nea Nikomedeia shows
the plurality of substances and
metaphorical relations (Per-
lès 2001.278) (Fig. 3). There
are also other ways in which
substances were directed
through human and non-hu-
man bodies, not least through
consumption practices. For in-
stance, the ‘Gorsza Venus’ an-
thropomorphic vessel from
Early Neolithic Körös culture portrays a headless fe-
male body, and contained a fragment of a human
skull (Kalicz 1980.23, Tab. 2) (Fig. 4). This vessel
could be seen as ‘mediator in their own right, object
as person whose major concern was the regulation
of flows of substance’ (Fowler 2004. 63) or ‘as con-
tainers, just as the human head is seen in many so-
cieties as the repository of the human soul’ (Brück
2006a.84). We may suggest that the vessel and the
skull fragment metaphorically build a new compo-
site body of the deceased. This body can be seen as
Fig. 5. Lepenski
vir Neolithic ‘Buil-
ding 40’. A human
mandible was pla-
ced upside down
with a stone pla-
que placed be-
tween the caudal
rami of the man-
dible. The mandi-
ble constitutes the
∀ architectural
element in place
of limestone pla-
ques (from Srejo-
vi≤ 1969.Fig. 70).
Fig. 6. Lepenski vir ‘Building 40’ context. A human mandible constitutes
an ∀ architectural element. A child burial below the floor in the rear of
the building. A sculpted boulder was placed above the child’s skull (after
Srejovi≤ 1969.Figs. 66, 70; Babovi≤ 2006.Figs. 186, 189).
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a vessel through a flow of essences.
Fowler (2008.52) suggests that in ca-
ses ‘where flows are usually stres-
sed over partiability the vessel of the
body may be fragmented’, but only
after the death of the person ‘in or-
der to allow dispersal of personal es-
sences’.
This link between fragmented hu-
man bodies extends further, in that
there is evidence for the use of hu-
man bones in Mesolithic and Neoli-
thic built environments in the Da-
nube gorge in the Northern Balkans.
In a number of buildings at Lepen-
ski vir, limestone plaques were pla-
ced as multiple ‘∀’ architectural ele-
ments next to the hearth slab. How-
ever, in one case in ‘Building 40’, a
human mandible constituted this
element instead of limestone pla-
ques. It was placed upside down,
with a stone plaque placed between
the caudal rami of the mandible (Fig.
5) (Srejovi≤ 1969.Fig.70; Bori≤ 2007.
114; Stefanovi≤, Bori≤ 2008.149).
Two other human mandibles were placed below the
hearths of ‘Buildings 31’ and ‘54’. The mandibles are
contextually associated with the child and neonate
burials below the floors in the rear of the buildings.
Sculpted boulders are embedded in all contexts, one
of them being an architectural part, as the human
mandible formed part of the stone hearth of ‘Buil-
ding 43’ (Srejovi≤ and Babovi≤ 1983.133). 
In the intentional distribution and redeposition of
human skulls within the built environments at Le-
penski Vir some distinctive practices are evident:
● a human skull with mandible absent was placed
in the rear of the hearth of ‘Building 47’, where it
was contextually associated with two neonate bu-
rials and an aniconic boulder;
● skull removal was noted in ‘child Burial 92’
(‘Building 28’), ‘articulated Burial 28’ (‘Building
XXXIII’), ‘extended Burial 54e’ (‘Building 65/
XXXV’), and ‘extended Burials 15 and 16’ (‘Buil-
ding XXVII’);
● the skull in ‘adult Burial 26’ (‘Building 34’) was
detached from the body and turned to face east,
to the Danube River, while the mandible was slum-
ped as if left in the anatomical position; 
● the skull in ‘contracted Burial 19’ (‘Building 54/
XLIV’) was removed and placed on the stone slab
that covered the burial (Stefanovi≤, Bori≤ 2008.
20–21).
It is worth noting that in some cases sculpted boul-
ders were placed on the floor immediately above
the head of the deceased buried within buildings.
A sculpted boulder in the form of a human head was
placed above the head of an approximately seven-
year-old child in ‘Burial 61’ in ‘Building 40’ (Fig. 6).
It is noted that the boulder represents a human face
with a schematic representation of its mouth and
nose and ‘opened eyes’ (Stefanovi≤, Bori≤ 2008.26,
34). In contrast, in ‘Burial 92’ (‘Building 28’) a boul-
der with a schematic representation of mouth, nose,
and ‘closed eyes’ was placed above a two- to three-
year-old child. The skeleton was placed in the exten-
ded anatomical position, absent its skull, with only
the mandible being present. This may indicate that
the skull was removed (Stefanovi≤, Bori≤ 2008.25)
(Fig. 7).
A decorated boulder was placed above a man’s skull
in ‘Burial 7/I’ in ‘Building 21’. The burial was em-
bedded next to the hearth, behind its rear. A de-
tached human skull which was heavily worn, pos-
sibly from handling, was placed on his left shoulder,
next to the head of the deceased. An auroch skull
Fig. 7. Lepenski Vir ‘Building 28’ context. A child burial below a
stone plate in the rear of the building. The skull was removed. A
sculpted boulder was placed above the burial (from Stefanovi≤, Bo-
ri≤ 2008.Fig. 18; Babovi≤ 2006.Fig. 420).
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was placed above his right shoulder, and a deer
skull with antlers next to it (Srejovi≤ 1969.Fig. 69;
Radovanovi≤ 1996.Fig. 4.3; Bori≤ 2005.Fig. 3.3;
Stefanovi≤, Bori≤ 2008) (Figs. 8 and 9). 
The deposition of human jaws in built contexts as-
sociated with objects and animal skulls can be tra-
ced across Europe. Thus, in a settlement context of
the Pitted Ware culture at Korsnäs in Södermanland
in Sweden, the mandible of an adult human was
found beside a small collection of fire cracked stones.
Beneath the jaw was a hollow edged stone chisel. A
dog skull, with lower jaw missing, lay beside it. A
clay ‘pearl’, tightly packed inside a bundle of fish
bones, had been placed in one of the dog’s eye soc-
kets. The assemblage was deposited in a two-metre-
long dug feature, with a filling containing a large
quantity of fish bones (Larsson 2009.118). The sec-
ond deposition, which has been attributed to Early
Neolithic Vla∏ka culture, was found in 1894 in the
Pejca v Lascu rock shelter on the Karst plateau in the
Northern Adriatic. Below a stone plate, which was
covered by a thick layer of ash, the fragments of a
‘human frontal bone’ and ‘young girl’s maxilla’ were
found. A dog mandible, mussel shells, sheep ribs, a
deer antler hammer and two bone points were pla-
ced beside the bone remains (Moser 1899.62–63).
In the mortuary practices and relational palimpsest at
Lepenski Vir we can recognise metaphorical links be-
tween (i) buried human bodies and buildings; (ii) se-
condary buried human skulls and mandibles and buil-
ding parts; (iii) neonate and child dead bodies, secon-
dary buried human mandibles, and sculpted boulders;
and (iv) adult dead bodies, animal bodies, secondary
buried human skulls, and sculptured boulders. 
These may all indicate rites of passage and a traje-
ctory from the corpse to bones, and to a new iden-
tity negotiated within the community as well as with
the deceased. The context of human and animal bo-
dies and secondary buried human skulls in indivi-
Fig. 8. Lepenski Vir ‘Building 21’ context. Flow of substances of (i) an adult man buried in a burial pit
cut through the floor of the building; (ii) the disarticulated human skull that was placed on his left shoul-
der; (iii) the auroch skull placed on his right shoulder, and a deer skull with antlers next to it; and (iv)
the sculpted boulder placed above his head (from Srejovi≤ 1969.Fig. 69; Bori≤ 2005.Fig. 3.3; Babovi≤ 2006.
Figs. 260, 312, 314).
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dual burials may indicate a fusion of the various sub-
stances that make possible the transformation of the
deceased into ancestor, spirit or ghost. Thus the scul-
pted boulders placed above the burials may have to
be seen as animate objects indicating the transfor-
med identity of the deceased, and that some of them
were selected to be archetypically representative of
the whole community, or even the cosmos, in mortu-
ary practices. We may hypothesise, therefore, that
personhood was attained and maintained through
the agency of active relationality. When death inter-
rupted it, mortuary rites functioned to resolve the
imbalance by the removal of one identity from so-
ciety and the creation of another, and by reintegra-
ting both the living and the dead into another state
of existence. Burial contexts and rites of passage
thus “[m]ay not be aimed at removing them from
society, as we might expect, but at reintegrating
them into society as different kinds of entities, dif-
ferent orders of person. The mortuary sphere is fo-
cal in the movement of personal substance, the re-
negotiation of value, and transformation of perso-
nal identity among survivors as well as the decea-
sed. Mortuary practices therefore have multiple
roles, including the deconstitution of the person,
and their reclassification as spirits, ghosts, ances-
tors, and other subsets of the community. While
the dead are transformed persons, they are often
present among the community either as identifi-
able forces, or through the recycling of their ele-
ments.” (Fowler 2004.45). 
Instead of conclusions
The recognised mortuary practices and fragmented
ritual palimpsest in Lepenski Vir lead us to the no-
tion of ritualisation as a strategic way of acting with-
in ‘complex traditions and systems’ for the construc-
tion of certain types of power relationships effective
within particular social organisations. Catherine Bell
discusses (1992.109–110, 197, 218, 221) them as a
codified and constructed social medium in which
“complex and multifarious details of ritual, most
of which must be done just so, are seen as appro-
priate demands or legitimate tradition”, the collec-
tive body seemingly “sees itself as responding to a
place, event, force, problem, or tradition”. In this
context, she suggests, some gradually come to dom-
inate others by the prestigious and privileged sta-
tus that ritualised activities claim. The flow of sub-
stances and manipulation of objects on the one hand,
and gathering and following a fixed agenda and re-
peating this activity, are thus not necessarily asso-
ciated either with social solidarity and conflict reso-
lution, or with the transmission of shared beliefs and
a dominant ideology as an internal subjectivity, but
the production of ritualised agents and power rela-
tions within a society. 
Fig. 9. A detailed view of the Lepenski
Vir ‘Building 21’ context (from Srejo-
vi≤ 1969.Fig. 69; Bori≤ 2005.Fig. 3.3;
Babovi≤ 2006.Figs. 260, 312, 314).
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The flow of substances, the fusion of subject and ob-
ject, and the perception of the individual as a rela-
tional, embedded, permeable and partible dividual
lead us to naturalism, animism, totemism and per-
spectivism, all which conceptualise non-humans as
persons, as well as humans as non-human. They po-
stulate subjective and social continuity between hu-
mans and animals, and between the living and the
ancestors. Shamanism – in which the capacity evin-
ced by some individuals to cross ontological boun-
daries and adopt the perspective of non-human sub-
jectivities in order to mediate relations between hu-
mans and non-humans – is embedded in these con-
texts (Bird-David 1999; Descola 1996; Groleau
2009; Ingold 2000; Pedersen 2001; Sillar 2009; Vi-
veiros de Castro 1998; 2004).
The embodiment of dead human and animal bodies
in built environments, and the incorporation of frag-
ments of human bodies into built structures may lead
us to hypothesise that the flow of substances was
symbolically embedded within a house, a “[m]oral
person, keeper of a domain composed altogether
of material and immaterial property, which per-
petuates itself by the transmission of its name, of
its fortune [destiny, chance] and of its titles in a
real or fictive line held as legitimate on the sole
condition that this continuity can express itself in
the language of kinship [descent] or of affinity [al-
liance], and, most often, of both together” (Lévi-
Strauss 1987.152). Thus, dividual, partible and per-
meable persons constitute a ‘house society’. The
house as a social institution, on the other hand, sym-
bolically and metaphorically mediates between hu-
mans and non-humans and the landscape.
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